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Zheng Wang. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and
Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
The title of Zheng Wang’s book refers to the Chinese phrase wuwang guochi, first used in
1915 to condemn Japan’s imperialist Twenty-One Demands on the Chinese government. Since
then, guochi—or national humiliation—has been employed to various degrees in Chinese public
discourse by different people and for different political purposes. As William Callahan’s
fascinating research on this topic has revealed, the government of the Chinese Nationalist Party
(GMD) in 1928 published calendars containing no less than 26 “National Humiliation Days” and
even made one of these “National Humiliation Days” a public holiday from 1927 onwards.1
Today, the phrase wuwang guochi is displayed in Chinese museums, appears in Chinese school
textbooks, and is used as a slogan in Chinese anti-American or anti-Japanese demonstrations.
Wang’s book, however, is not a historical study of perceived national humiliations of the Chinese
at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists, but an attempt to explain how the myth of
“national humiliation” has become China`s “chosen trauma,” which has informed official
Chinese behavior in most major dealings with the rest of the world over the past two decades.
This attempt is only partly successful, suffering above all from unsubstantiated generalizations
and apologetic celebrations of the leadership and policies of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).
Wang’s guiding interest and approach are praiseworthy. He rightly draws attention to the
lack of general interest in the role collective memory and history politics play in analyses of
modern China.2 To him, “historical memory is the key to understanding Chinese politics and
foreign relations” (7). As the main influence on modern historical consciousness in China, Wang
identifies the so-called “century of humiliation.” By this, he—and the CCP—refer to the time
from the First Opium War (1840) to the end of the Second World War in 1945, including China’s
defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894/95), the Allied suppression of the Boxer Rebellion
(1900), the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty (1919), which—though Wang claims otherwise—the
Chinese delegation never signed, and the Japanese invasion of China from 1931 onwards. When
the CCP was faced with a legitimation crisis after Deng Xiaoping’s modernization policies, the
breakdown of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe, and the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, the
party sought to fill the ideological void by starting a patriotic education campaign in 1991. The
“century of humiliation,” never to be forgotten by the Chinese people, became the rhetorical
cornerstone of this campaign. According to Wang, former president Jiang Zemin was the driving
force behind this “patriotic turn,” which initially only targeted young people and students but
later became a nationwide mobilization. In fact, the “CCP set the entire propaganda machine in
motion for this campaign” (112). As a result, the party created a huge reservoir of nationalistic
youth, equipped with an anti-foreign historical consciousness, which the CCP can easily activate
to serve its own needs. Wang’s case studies of perceived continuing humiliations and the official
and popular reactions to them include the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1995-96) over Lee Teng-hui’s
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visit to the US, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the US air force, and
the US-China warplane collision in 2001. These renewed “humiliations” of China serve to
validate the official “victim narrative” of the past, which, in the 1990’s, replaced the previous
“victor narrative” that had celebrated Communism, class struggle, and Mao`s successes—and
omitted his failures. “Education on national humiliation” is promoted by official speeches,
newspaper editorials, TV series, school education, and more than 10,000 patriotic education
bases all over China (“a forest of monuments”). It aims at keeping alive the memories of
historical denigration in order to stimulate pride in China’s ongoing “rejuvenation” and to teach
the Chinese people to love their motherland, the party, and socialism (104).
This richness of sources on this topic provides the potential for a profound and thorough
study of Chinese history politics. Wang, a native of Kunming in Southwest China and former
deputy director of a Beijing-based think-tank, should be given credit for having authored the first
monograph on this important subject. There are, however, more than a few problems with
Wang`s analysis. To begin with, the relation between the past, historical memory, elite mythmaking, and identity is never spelled out.3 Wang does not clearly distinguish the past from
history and memory, nor does he ever discuss the difference between assigned and chosen
identities. His treatment of nationalism also relies on a simplistic model that distinguishes
nationalism along geographical and cultural lines: “forward-looking and universalistic”
American versus “backward-looking and particularistic” Chinese nationalism (25). Readers of
this book, unfortunately, are permanently confronted with cultural essentialism (China`s “deep
culture,” 11) and simplistic stereotypes: “many in the West tend to…”, “people in the West,”
“Westerners,” “the Chinese people,” “the Chinese understanding of history,” “many Chinese
enthusiastically believe…,” “the Chinese national character,” and so on. What makes the use of
this stereotypical vocabulary worse is that none of these general claims come with any statistical
or other proof. What is the academic worth of stereotypical generalizations such as “The
American sense of history makes Americans generally insensitive to other people`s historical
grievances” (25)? Furthermore, Wang never defines his key vocabulary: what does he mean by
“China” and “the Chinese”? Does he mean to imply that there is no significant difference
between the historical memory of people in mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the
Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Americas? And whose “China” is this?
All too often, Wang fails to distinguish between the political leadership, top-down rhetoric, and
official propaganda on the one side and the harsh socio-economic reality of hundreds of millions
on the other side, who probably care a good deal less about the “century of humiliation” than
about safe labor and food, clean water and air.
Wang’s uncritical celebration of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 is a case in point.
Euphemistically, he compares the hosting to a “family wedding” (156) and praises the “worldleading count of 51 gold medals, … splendid opening ceremony, and the construction of
expensive sports facilities” (153-154), while there is no mention at all of the human costs of
these “successes”: harsh labor conditions, environmental damage, forced migration, doping,
questionable training methods, etc. The low point of the book, however, is Wang`s hagiographic
portrayal of the party’s reaction to the devastating Sichuan earthquake in 2008. Wang implies
that in view of the frequency of natural disasters, Chinese people prefer a strong government to
freedom of speech and then praises the “government`s swift and effective response to the
3
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Sichuan earthquake” (157). He completely ignores that many “natural” disasters in China have a
very strong man-made element. This is not only the case historically, when famines starved
millions to death as a result of Mao`s failed economic policies, but also regarding the 2008
Sichuan earthquake. The latter was most likely caused by a massive nearby hydro-electric dam,
and the high death tolls were due to the infamous “tofu” construction of many buildings that get
construction permits through bribery rather than safety inspections. But Wang insists that
“through its humanitarian actions, the CCP brought the people closer to the government” (158).
At this point, the reviewer could not help but wonder if he was reading a scholarly work
published by a renowned US university press or a propaganda pamphlet from the People’s Press
in Beijing. Is it too far-fetched to assume that much of the efficiency of “collectivism” which
Wang celebrates in fact results from coercion and the suppression of alternative views and
approaches that could prove equally or even more efficient and effective? Wang also celebrates
the media coverage of the earthquake, claiming that “newspapers, television, and online media
reported events openly” (161), yet he ignores the inconvenient fact of massive and continued
censorship. Even on the fifth anniversary of the tragedy this year, the Central Propaganda
Department issued censorship requests that demanded “positive coverage.”4 Would such requests
be necessary if the CCP had handled everything as skillfully as Wang suggests?
It is symptomatic of Wang’s biased analysis that those Chinese who criticize the state and
party leadership and offer alternative views on the past, the present, and the future of Chinese
society, such as the artist Ai Weiwei, Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo, the blind activist Chen
Guangcheng, or writer Liao Yiwu, are not mentioned in this study even once.
To be fair, the last chapter of the book, which discusses nationalism in cyberspace and the
tensions between nationalism and globalism, works as a partial corrective to the previous
chapters. Wang eventually admits that “the master narrative of national history is still based on
official statements rather than public consensus” and that party leaders “have always avoided
discussing the tremendous failures and catastrophes that have been caused by the party” (242).
These concessions, however, do not change the generally apologetic tone of this book. Despite
its many problems, this reviewer still recommends this book to any reader interested in the “rise
of China,” Chinese history politics, or Chinese nationalism. The value of reading Wang’s book
does not lie in its scholarship; nonetheless, as a document that attests to how successful the
Chinese nationalism resulting from patriotic education and top-down history politics can be,
even among Chinese intellectuals abroad, it speaks volumes.
Torsten Weber
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